an overview of the civilian EMP problems , to note aspects transferable from military developments , to obtain the viewpoints of affected industries, and to identify future needs and implementation requirements. Unclassified presentations on the first day, with attendant discussion periods, were followed the next day by a much smaller workshop at classified levels.
EMP Environment and Effects
Of basic importance is the nature of the radio-frequency electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear burst. Over the last few years, sufficient information has been released in unclassified form from reliable sources ' ' ' ' to permit intelligent susceptibility analyses and hardening programs for civil defense purposes.
The subsequent discussion in this section briefly summarizes some of the more important aspects of this environment and, also, serves to introduce the problem area.
Under the proper circumstances, a significant portion of the energy released during a nuclear detonation can appear as an electromagnetic pulse. The spectral components of this pulse include the same frequencies as those employed by commercial radio and military system equipments. When the British first became aware of this particular phenomenon, they more appropriately called it the "radio flash".
The EMP from a nuclear detonation is dependent on the weapon burst point and location of possible affected systems. There are two weapon burst points of significance to civilian systems. In one case, the weapon is burst within the atmosphere near the target, and in the other, the weapon is burst just above the atmosphere» In the first place, the atmosphere or air has a containing effect on the EMP generation mechanisms; and as a result, any possible EMP damage is concomitant with other types of close-in nuclear weapons effects damage such as blast and fire. In addition, the EMP arising from detonations within the atmosphere close to the earth's surface is generally not of great significance in relation to other nuclear weapons elfects.
On the other hand, if a high yield weapon is detonated just outside of the atmosphere, the EMP generation mechanisms are such that a fairly efficient conversion of the nuclear energy into the electromagnetic radio frequency spectrum occurs. This electromagnetic energy is radiated from the upper atmosphere downward to the earth's surface and can illuminate a very substantial fraction of the earth's surface. This radio-frequency-spectrum electromagnetic pulse illumination can occur at very high field intensities and with very unusual waveshapes. It is not accompanied by any other prompt nuclear weapons effects such as blast, thermal, dust, debris and biological effects. Owing to the very ^MMMi lf$ high levels of intensities and unique waveform, the EMP has the capability to affect, at great distances, the operation of electrical and electronic equipments which have not been hardened.
Typical ranges for the maximum ground coverage are illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The waveform of electromagnetic fields and associated spectra of the EMP differ from those of other natural, more commonly used man-made sources. A typical EMP test waveform which is used to evaluate equipment responses has a rise time on ehe order of -8 10 nanoseconds (10 seconds), a peak value of 50,000 volts per meter, and an exponential fall time on the order of 500 nanoseconds. This waveform has a much greater amplitude and a much faster rise time than the fields radiated from a nearby lightning stroke, as shown in Fig. 2 . Another important point is that the very intense EMP fields occur nearly simultaneously over large areas of the surface of the earth. Very high amplitude natural or man-made fields are usually quite localized. The EMP occupies a spectrum roughly from very low frequencies well into the lower microwave band, whereas most man-made fields are confined spectrally as well as spatially. This is indicated in Fig. 2 . EMP is sufficiently different than any other normally occuring highlevel electromagnetic environment that the usual protection devices, such as surge arresters and filters, do not always provide sufficient protection without the addition of other measures.
The understanding of how EMP is generated has reached a point where good agreement exists between the theoretical results and observed measurements taken during the atmospheric tests.
As a consequence, EMP waveform parameters of known significance can, for the most important cases, be described within a factor of two, and for the more unusual situations well within a factor of ten.
Numerous examples of EMP induced damage or disruptions were observed during the atmospheric test programs. Such examples range from damaged cables due to arc-overs to the false tripping of street light systems from the EMP which arose many hundreds of miles away from the weapon detonation point.
Similar results have been observed for modem, sophisticated equipment exposed to EMP simulated by non-nuclear techniques.
These equipments, if not otherwise protected, exhibit a very high probability to be operationally upset at a very low level of EMP illumination. For example, the data in a digital computer can be scrambled at field intensities as low as a few hundred volts per meter. Wholesale burnout of large numbers of components has net been noted; however, functional damage to a few critical elements attached to exposed cables or antennas can occur, often in unexpected ways. In general, the more modern and sophisticated equipments show a high potential for EMP degradation than the older, more simple units. Other services, such as police, medical, rescue and evacuation, and welfare will be provided as the environment permits.
The primary two-way radio communications associated with these services are those that are normally used by these agencies.
On a longer time frame, the post-attack recovery of the public power utilities system, water supplies, sewage treatment, fuel delivery, rail, truck, and bus traffic, and aircraft control are similarly dependent on the two-way radio communication. It appears that the EBS will continue to have a role in the state and local operations. However, as now configured, the EBS is unreliable vis-a-vis the EMP, owing to lack of rigorous application of cost effective EMP hardening measures. To assure complete reliability of the EBS system, the telephone network should be supplemented by a preplanned hardening radio relay for state and local use. The EBS system can also supply clarifying information to the public, possibly necessary after the activation of the acoustical warning sirens of an impending attack. During the attack, the warning system could well be damaged (although this remains to be studied) and the EBS could be used to provide guidance to the public during the attack and recovery periods. The subsequent discussion considers: first, the general EMP effects on power transmission and distribution portion; second, the behavior of the supervisory and control elements; third, network aspects; fourth, countermeasures for power systems; and fifth, response of user equipment and resultant hardening.
Programs

General Response of Transmission and Distribution Lines
The results to date indicate the EMP from a high altitude nuclear explosion will induce a current and voltage surge through-6 14 out the electric power system. '
The voltages and currents will be induced on the transmission and distribution lines as well as other portions of the power system, such as control circuits.
These will be characterized by very fast rates of rise, high peak values, and short time durations. The peak values of the current pulses depend on the orientation and geometry of the lines, and can be as great as 10-30 kilo-amperes. Although these values are somewhat less than the total current of an average lightning stroke, it is greater than the average lightning current appearing in the lightning arrestors. Voltages developed by EMP illumination can rise to values in the order of several megavolts.
These EMP induced pulses differ from lightning in several ways. First, the rise time of the pulses may be up to 10 or more times faster than the rise times associated with lightning. Second, these pulses can appear simultaneously throughout the entire power system. This universal illumination aspect of the high altitude EMP-induced pulses means that the system will be thoroughly tested for its weakest components. This is in contrast to lightning-induced pulses which analogously only "spot check" the system for weaknesses. Furthermore, in any attack there may be many high altitude explosions. This means that the power system will be subject to repeated universal tests by EMP induced surges.
It is virtually certain that the weak points will be found. 
Power Network
The dynamic effect of an EMP or a series of EMP bursts on the entire power system was considered during a rather \iwit#u and preliminary study. This appears to be desirable in the supervisory control equipment, and especially those circuits and subsystem elements necessary to reconstitute the system after a possible massive power outage.
Also, as an interim measure, it appears to be desirable to provide sufficient guidance to the power companies so that they In general, the basic "tools" needed to harden a system are being actively developed by the military. These have been and can be expected to be made available in appropriate format for civil defense purposes . Civil preparedness programs are highly sensitive to the availability of electric power. If, as recently concluded on a policy basis, planning for local operations must assume absence of power, ventilation problems for below-grade shelter spaces must be dealt with using alternative approaches. An equivalent evaluation of telephone, radio, fire, water and other specialized systems is needed.
A low-cost, layman-oriented methodology (not using testing)
for appraising vulnerability of unimproved facilities, such as local operating centers in unprotected structures, is also urgently needed. Coupled with simple upgrading guidance, developed in parallel with a limited program of experimentation and testing, such an application of engineering judgment offers the greatest hope for civil system improvement. This becomes especially true if DCPA does not maintain a significant EMP program for the immediate future.
APPENDIX A IMPLICATIONS OF EMP FOR CIVILIAN SYSTEMS
As part of their conclusions regarding EMP effects, the (1969) seminar participants agreed on the following 13 points and recommended that these points be disseminated.
1.
Electromagnetic environments of significance to civilian systems can be described within a factor of 2 or, at worst, an order of magnitude.
2.
The most sensitive hardware of a given system can be selected with acceptable confidence for further study. 
